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Abstract
Background: While the sense of bodily ownership has now been widely investigated through the rubber hand illusion (RHI),
very little is known about the sense of disownership. It has been hypothesized that the RHI also affects the ownership
feelings towards the participant’s own hand, as if the rubber hand replaced the participant’s actual hand. Somatosensory
changes observed in the participants’ hand while experiencing the RHI have been taken as evidence for disownership of
their real hand. Here we propose a theoretical framework to disambiguate whether such somatosensory changes are to be
ascribed to the disownership of the real hand or rather to the anomalous visuo-proprioceptive conflict experienced by the
participant during the RHI.
Methodology/Principal Findings: In experiment 1, reaction times (RTs) to tactile stimuli delivered to the participants’ hand
slowed down following the establishment of the RHI. In experiment 2, the misalignment of visual and proprioceptive inputs
was obtained via prismatic displacement, a situation in which ownership of the seen hand was doubtless. This condition
slowed down the participants’ tactile RTs. Thus, similar effects on touch perception emerged following RHI and prismatic
displacement. Both manipulations also induced a proprioceptive drift, toward the fake hand in the first experiment and
toward the visual position of the participants’ hand in the second experiment.
Conclusions/Significance: These findings reveal that somatosensory alterations in the experimental hand resulting from the
RHI result from cross-modal mismatch between the seen and felt position of the hand. As such, they are not necessarily a
signature of disownership.
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Introduction
In everyday life, there is little doubt that the body that I feel is
my own. I know where my body parts lie in space and I know that
every tactile sensation I feel comes from my body surface,
irrespective of whether I see it or not. In the last decade the
phenomenon of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) has called these
certainties into question [1]. When their hand is hidden from view
and is stroked in synchrony with a visible rubber hand,
participants typically feel the strokes as if they originated from
the location where the rubber hand is stroked. Furthermore, they
can experience an illusory feeling of ownership towards the rubber
hand. By contrast, asynchronous stroking of the rubber hand and
the real hand prevents or abolishes the illusion (e.g. [2]; for a
review see [3]). The displacement of touch onto the rubber hand is
thought to be determined by a mechanism of visual capture of the
tactile percept [4,5]. Synchronous brushing induces a conflict
between visual and proprioceptive information, which is partially
solved in favor of vision [6], provided that prior knowledge about
the body is not violated (e.g.[5,2,7]). Accordingly, the RHI is
typically followed by a proprioceptive drift of the felt own hand
position towards the rubber hand (e.g.[8]).
While the sense of bodily ownership has been now widely
investigated through an impressive series of RHI studies, little is still
known about the sense of disownership. There is indeed no
experimental set-up that can artificially induce the explicit sensation
of disownership of one’s own hand. Body part disownership has
mainly been described in the neuropsychological literature,
especially after lesions of the right hemisphere [9,10]. Disownership
of contralesional limbs has often been associated with neglect,
hemiplegia and somatosensory deficits, although these three
disturbances are dissociable. Moro and colleagues [11], for example,
described two patients suffering both from tactile extinction and
somatoparaphrenia. The patients denied ownership of their
contralesional limbs and reported that their limbs belonged to
someone else (for review see [12]). Changing hand position in space
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disownership, thus providing evidence that the neural substrates
underlying the two symptoms are at least partly separated. Another
case study that highlights the complexity of the relationship between
disownership and tactile perception (for discussion see [13]) has been
reported by Bottini and colleagues [14] (see also [15]). They
described apatientsufferingfromdenialofownership oftheleftarm,
who consistently attributed the left arm to her niece. Although she
was unable to perceive touches on her left arm in normal conditions,
she was able to detect tactile stimulations when the experimenter
pretended to touch ‘‘her niece’s hand’’.
In order to provide better understanding of disownership
phenomena in brain damaged patients, it would be of great
interest to be able to induce and manipulate disownership in
healthy participants. Interestingly, it has been recently suggested
that the RHI is not only an ownership illusion, but also a
disownership illusion [16,17]. In particular, researchers have
started to ask whether the sense of ownership felt towards the
rubber hand can be accompanied by a sense of disownership
towards the real hand. Put another way, is the rubber hand merely
perceived as a third supernumerary limb, or does it somehow
replace the participant’s real hand? Longo and colleagues [16] ran
a principal-components analysis on a detailed RHI questionnaire
and revealed a component which comprised items reflecting
paralysis of the hand and its disappearance. They assumed that
this component indicates changes in the participants’ feelings
about their own hand and lack of agency over it, and accordingly
called it ‘loss of own hand’. However, they underlined that this
component only explained a small proportion of the variance of
the RHI phenomenon. In addition, agreements with the
statements concerning the loss of one’s own hand were rather
weak. Along the same line, Moseley and colleagues [17] showed a
decrease in skin temperature of the real hand following the RHI.
In addition, they showed that after having the right hand and the
rubber hand stroked, participants required a larger inter stimulus
interval to correctly determine the order of two tactile stimuli
delivered to the left and right hands in a Temporal Order
Judgment (TOJ) task, as if the denial of one’s own hand decreased
the weighting of tactile information felt on this hand. The authors
interpreted the physiological variation and the somatosensory
change in terms of functional disownership, suggesting that the
participant’s real hand was replaced by the artificial counterpart.
As no detailed questionnaire was reported in the study, it remains
to be established whether implicit somatosensory changes are
accompanied by explicit feelings of disownership.
The consequences and significance of the RHI for the
participant’s real hand are thus only partially understood.
Somatosensory changes in the real hand might result from
disownership, if there is disownership .Alternatively, rather than
disownership they might reflect the anomalous visuo-propriocep-
tive conflict experienced by the participant during the RHI. In the
present study, we examined whether changes in tactile perception
should be attributed to disownership or to the visuo-proprioceptive
conflict. In the former case, any effect on somatosensation should
be specific to manipulations that alter body part ownership, such
as the RHI. In the latter case, effects on somatosensation should
also be found in other situations of visuo-proprioceptive conflict in
which body part ownership is not altered (see Figure 1). Such
situation can be obtained when the real hand is perceived through
prismatic lenses, which introduce a conflict between hand position
experienced through proprioception and hand position as
indicated by vision, without introducing any uncertainty about
the body part ownership. To test our hypotheses, we used a
speeded simple detection task of suprathreshold electro-cutaneous
stimuli to assess the ability to report tactile stimulation on the real
hand after induction of the RHI (Experiment 1) and while wearing
prismatic goggles (Experiment 2).
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Fifteen (10 females, mean age 25.8 years; 12 right-handed and 3
left-handed by self-report) and ten (6 females, mean age 25.6 years,
right handed) healthy subjects participated in Experiment 1 and 2,
respectively. All gave their verbal informed consent to participate
in the study, which was approved by the INSERM U864 ethics
committee. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and normal touch perception by self report.
Apparatus and procedures Experiment 1
Participants sat at a table in a sound-attenuated and dimly
illuminated room, facing the experimental apparatus (see Figure 2).
Figure 1. Alternative models for somatosensory changes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006920.g001
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a wooden frame covered by a semi-silvered mirror. The rubber
hand (a real-size prosthetic model of a right hand) was placed
7.5 cm to the right of the body midline and 15 cm to the left of the
concealed right hand (all measures taken with respect to the
stimulated middle finger). The rubber hand was slightly oriented
anti-clockwise, to maximize posture plausibility with respect to the
participant’s right elbow. A fixation point was marked on the table
along the body midline, 7.5 cm to the left of the rubber hand. The
rubber hand was thus visible in peripheral vision, unlike most
previous studies (but see [5]). At a viewing distance of about
40 cm, the distance between the stimulated finger on the rubber
hand and the fixation point subtended an angle of about 10.5
degrees.
Tactile task
Supra-threshold electro-cutaneous stimuli (DS7A, Digitimer)
were delivered to the participant’s right middle fingertip via
disposable neurology electrodes (Neuroline). Stimulation was
controlled by a computerized script (xgen; www.sph.sc.edu/
comd/rorden). Prior to the experimental session, a variable
number of blocks of tactile stimuli (10 stimuli per block) was
delivered to each participant for titration purposes (to obtain
$80% of accurate detection)
The experimental block of tactile stimulation comprised 20 trials
and lasted about 80 seconds. Each trial began with a warning sound
(beep) after which a tactile stimulus or no stimulus (catch trials)
followed randomly interleaved. Participants were instructed to
maintain central fixation (monitored via an infrared webcam) and
to respond vocally (‘‘tah’’) as soon as they felt a tactile stimulus. Their
vocal reaction times (RT) were recorded by means of a voice key.
During the tactile task, the lights under the mirror were switched on.
This had the effect of making the rubber hand visible, whereas the
participant’s hand remained concealed from view.
Proprioceptive judgment task
Immediately following the tactile task, participants were
required to estimate the position of their hidden right middle-
finger by means of a ruler reflected on the mirror and appearing to
be at the same depth as the hands (see [2] for this method). They
were instructed to report the number on the ruler corresponding
to the position of their finger by mentally projecting a parasagittal
line from the finger to the ruler. During proprioceptive judgments
the lights under the mirror were switched off to make the rubber
hand invisible while only the ruler was visible. Participants were
required to repeat the judgment 6 times, with the ruler always
presented with a random offset in order to avoid response
strategies. The mismatch between the true position of the finger
and the number indicated by the participant was calculated and
resulted in a positive number if the displacement was towards the
rubber hand and a negative number if it was away from it. This
procedure allowed measuring the drift of the perceived position of
the participant’s own hand towards the rubber hand, a well
established measure of the RHI [1,2].
Visuo-Tactile training
After the judgment the ruler was removed and the lights under
the mirror were turned on to make the rubber hand appear. A
two-minute stimulation with identical paintbrushes followed. Both
the fake and real hands were manually stimulated with touches
delivered along the dorsum of the middle-finger. Across separate
conditions, brushes on the fake and real hand were delivered both
synchronously and asynchronously, with a resting period of 5
minutes between the two conditions. Order of these two conditions
was counterbalanced between participants.
Both the tactile and the proprioceptive judgment tasks were
repeated after synchronous and asynchronous training. In sum, all
participants underwent two experimental sessions, each composed
of tactile task, proprioceptive judgment, visuo-tactile training, then
repetition of tactile task and proprioceptive judgment in the same
order.
Questionnaire
At the end of each session, participants were also required to
complete a questionnaire, rating their agreement with 12
statements describing the RHI experience. Six statements referred
to the experience of embodiment of the rubber hand and
addressed both the displacement of the tactile percept onto the
fake hand and its ownership (e.g., ‘‘It seemed as if I were feeling
the touch of the paintbrush in the location where I saw the rubber
hand touched’’ or ‘‘I felt as if the rubber hand were my own
hand’’). The remaining six statements referred to the feeling of
disownership of their own hand (e.g., ‘‘It seemed as if my right
hand had disappeared’’). Participants were asked to judge their
level of agreement with each statement by drawing a mark on a
14 cm long continuous line in which the left extreme indicated
complete disagreement and the right extreme indicated complete
agreement. See questionnaire in Appendix S1.
Apparatus and Procedures Experiment 2
The same experimental set-up and procedures of Experiment 1
were used in Experiment 2, unless otherwise stated. As in
Experiment 1, participants underwent the tactile titration
procedure and were then submitted to the same tactile task that
was, however, performed in two different visual conditions: One in
which they were wearing goggles fitted with neutral lenses, and
one in which the goggles were fitted with prismatic lenses
displacing the visual field leftwards by 15 degrees of visual angle.
Figure 2. Set-up experiment 1. The picture represents an actor who
consented to be photographed for illustrative graphical purposes.
Viewing distance from the fixation point is reported, as well as the
distance between the rubber hand middle finger and the fixation point
(in cm).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006920.g002
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prisms, the tactile task was administered twice with neutral
goggles, immediately before and after the tactile task performed
while wearing the prismatic lenses. During these blocks, the light
under the mirror were turned on and the participant saw his/her
own hand (displaced or not, depending on the visual condition).
Before and after each block of tactile task, the lights were switched
off and participants were asked to perform 6 proprioceptive
judgments of the position of their right middle finger. In addition,
to check for any passive adaptation possibly induced by wearing
the prisms, participants also made a series of 6 open-loop (no visual
feedback from the moving hand) pointing movements to a visual
target briefly presented in front of them, at the beginning and at
the end of the blocks. No after-effects were expected, as no visuo-
motor adaptation was induced.
It should be noted that the point of fixation differed between
neutral and prismatic blocks, to make the distance between eye
fixation and proprioceptive inputs comparable across visual
conditions. This is illustrated in Figure 3. In the prismatic lenses
condition participants saw their hand displaced about 10,5 cm to
the left of its real position (due to the 15u prismatic displacement,
at a viewing distance of about 40 cm). To ensure that in both
conditions the eyes were fixating at the same distance relative to
the proprioceptively specified position of the hand, the fixation
point lay 18 cm left from the middle finger in the neutral lenses
condition, and 7.5 cm (as in Experiment 1) from the middle finger
in the prismatic lenses condition (i.e., 10.5 cm rightwards). This
procedure was adopted because slower processing of tactile
stimulation has been previously documented when the partici-
pant’s attention or gaze has been diverted from the stimulated
hand, even when hand vision is prevented [18–22]. While the
questionnaire was not administrated in experiment 2, none of the
participants spontaneously reported feeling as if her hand no
longer belonged or ‘‘belonged less’’ to her.
Results
Experiment 1
Questionnaire. The mean values of agreement for each
question were analysed to characterise the subjective description
of the RHI associated feelings. The results are graphically illustrated
in Figure 4. An ANOVA was performed considering the variables
synchrony of the training (synchronous/asynchronous) and embodiment
(embodiment of the rubber hand/loss of own hand), according to
the results of the principal components analysis by Longo and
colleagues [16]. Both synchrony [F(1,14)=21.42 p=.0004] and
embodiment [F(1,14)=7.42 p=.02], as well as their interaction were
significant [F(1,14)=21.93 p=.0003], revealing that the kind of
visuo-tactile training influenced differentially the participants’
agreement feelings. Overall, participants were more likely to agree
with the questionnaire’s statements after synchronous (5.18 cm)
than asynchronous training (3.07 cm). The agreement was also
Figure 3. Set-up experiment 2. The pictures represent an actor who consented to be photographed for illustrative graphical purposes. The
distance from the actor’s real hand and the fixation point was 18 cm both in the neutral (left panel) and optically displaced condition (right panel).
The shaded hand in the left panel represent the virtual location of the hand and fixation point, as seen by the subject trough prismatic goggles
inducing a shift of about 15 degrees of visual angle.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006920.g003
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(5.04 cm) than those related to loss of their own hand (3.3 cm). The
interaction critically revealed that after synchronous training
participants agreed more strongly with questions related to
embodiment of the rubber hand (7.1) with respect to questions
related to loss of their own hand (3.27, p=.0002). The two
components did not differ after asynchronous training, where the
agreement was globally weaker (2.99 vs. 3.14, respectively).
In a separate analysis we focused on the two sub-components
distinguished by Longo et al, [16] within the ‘‘embodiment of the
rubber hand’’ general component, namely location of touch
(questions 1–3) and ownership (questions 4–6, see Appendix S1),
to assess whether they were equally involved during the induction
of the RHI. To this aim, we performed an ANOVA exclusively on
questions related to embodiment of the rubber hand with synchrony
(synchronous and asynchronous) and component (location and
ownership) as within-subject variables. As in the previous analysis
the variable synchrony was highly significant [F(1,14)=44.76,
p=.00001], with stronger agreement after synchronous (7.10)
than asynchronous training (2.99). Moreover, the significant
interaction [F(1,14)=6.02, p=.03] showed a more important
contribution of the component location (8.27) than ownership (5.94)
in determining the higher mean in the synchronous condition
(p=.006, by Newman-Keuls post-hoc test).
Proprioceptive judgment task. The mean estimated
location of the middle finger position of each participant’s
unseen hand was submitted to a repeated measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with the variables visuo-tactile training
(synchronous, asynchronous) and session (pre-, post-training).
Results are shown in Figure 5a. The interaction between the
two variables was significant [F (1,14)=8.92, p=.01]. Participants
erred toward the rubber hand and this drift increased both after
synchronous (from 4.2 cm to 7.0 cm, p=.0002) and asynchronous
training (from 4.6 cm to 5.8 cm, p=.004). Critically, however, this
increase was significantly larger after synchronous than
asynchronous training, as shown by a significant difference
between errors after the two types of visuo-tactile training
(7.0 cm vs. 5.8 cm, p=.006 by Newman-Keuls post-hoc test).
Tactile task. A similar ANOVA with the same variables was
performed on the mean RTs to electro-cutaneous stimuli. Also on
this variable the interaction visuo-tactile training and session was
significant [F (1, 14)=4.79, p=.046]. In particular, as illustrated
in Figure 5b, RTs were slowed down with respect to the initial
baseline after synchronous (from 492.6 to 523 ms, p=.04), but not
after asynchronous training (from 492.3 to 481.9 ms, p=0.4 by
Newman-Keuls post-hoc test). Participants made very few
detection errors (i.e., omissions) and the pattern of accuracy was
not significantly different (varying from 89% to 84% in the
synchronous condition, and from 91% to 90% in the
asynchronous condition; interaction p=0.3), thus excluding any
speed-accuracy trade-off.
Experiment 2
Proprioceptive judgment task. The mean values of the
proprioceptive judgments made before and after every block were
submitted to an ANOVA with visuo-proprioceptive alignment (neutral
pre-prisms = match, prisms = mismatch, neutral post-prisms =
match) and session (pre-, post-training) as variables. No main effect
was significant, but the significant interaction [F (2,18)=6.29,
p=.008] revealed that the mean judgment of hand position was
significantly more biased towards the optically displaced position
of the participant’s hand (i.e., leftwards) after the prismatic block
(2.0 cm), than before the same block (0.7 cm, p=.02 by Newman-
Keuls post-hoc test). No differences were present between
judgments performed before and after wearing neutral goggles
(see Figure 6a).
Figure 4. Questionnaire results. Mean level of agreement with the questionnaire statements (for specific questions, see Appendix S1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006920.g004
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submitted to an ANOVA with visuo-proprioceptive alignment as within-
subject variable (see Figure 6b). The visuo-proprioceptive alignment
variable was significant [F (2.18)=7.01, p=.006], showing that RTs
were slower when participants wore prismatic goggles, that is in the
condition in which vision and proprioception were misaligned, with
respect to when they wore neutral goggles, where matching inputs
were provided by vision and proprioception (neutral pre-prisms,
mean=459.3 ms, neutral post-prisms, mean=464 ms, prisms,
mean=488 ms; p,.007 and .009 respectively for both
comparisons between neutral goggles and prisms by Newman-
Keuls post-hoc test). Again, the pattern of accuracy was not
significantly different across conditions (88% in both neutral goggles
conditions and 88% in prism condition), thus excluding any speed-
accuracy trade-off.
Prismatic after-effect. As expected, a paired t-test between
mean open-loop pointing performances at the beginning
(mean=0.13 cm) and at the end of the session (mean=0.
48 cm) did not show any difference (t=21.05, p=0.31).
Discussion
The question of how the human brain can generate a sense of
ownership towards external body-parts, like rubber hands [2,3],
other people’s faces [23], or even whole bodies [24,25] has
propelled the RHI [1] as the main tool for investigating bodily
self-consciousness, and brought about new theories concerning
whether it is conditional for self-consciousness to emerge to be
spatially situated in the body [13,26,27]. A seminal approach in this
respectistodeterminetheconditionsandconstraintsforafake body
part (e.g. [28,7] or entire body [29,30] to be felt as one’s own.
Another much less investigated perspective consists in estab-
lishing whether appropriating an alien body part would impact the
sense of ownership of the corresponding real body part. Two
interesting studies [16,17] have recently addressed the question of
disownership by assessing possible changes on the real hand either
at the physiological and perceptual levels or at the introspective
level. Thermal variations and altered temporal judgments were
reported after RHI [17] and loss of one’s hand is indeed part of the
Figure 5. Somatosensory results experiment 1. Mean performances (in cm) in the proprioceptive judgment task (a) as a function of the session
and synchrony of the visuo-tactile training; Mean RT performances (and S.E., in ms) in tactile task (b) as a function of synchrony of the visuo-tactile
training and session.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006920.g005
Figure 6. Somatosensory results experiment 2. Mean performances (in cm) in the proprioceptive judgment task (a) as a function of the visual
conditions; Mean RT performances (and S.E., in ms) in tactile task (b) as a function of the visual conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006920.g006
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ownership towards the rubber hand leads to implicit ‘rejecting’
one’s real hand (but see [31]), which in turn induces somatosen-
sory variations in one’s real hand. However, here we provided
evidence for an alternative explanation.
Experiment 1 revealed a strong RHI as proved by the subjective
agreement with the questionnaire’s statements following synchro-
nous training and, more objectively, by the larger proprioceptive
drift following the same training. This is in line with classical
findings [1,2,32,33] although it was induced here under peripheral
vision of the rubber hand unlike most previous works (but see [5]).
More importantly, the induction of the RHI altered tactile
perception on the participant’s real hand, as assessed by tactile
RTs. This is the first measure of the RHI that is purely relatedto the
critical, synchronous condition. There is indeed a proprioceptive
drift both after synchronous and asynchronous stimulations, as
compared with pre-test. The RHI is then typically measured on the
basis of the relative difference between the two drifts. By contrast in
the tactile task there was no effect of asynchronous stimulation on
tactile perception, as compared with pre-test. It was only after
synchronousstimulationthat participantswereslowerinresponding
to supra-threshold touches delivered to their right, experimental
hand. Hence, compared to the proprioceptive drift the slowing of
tactile RTs seems to be highly selective for the phenomenon of the
RHI. These results confirm our prediction that the RHI should
affect tactile perception on the participant’s real hand.
As shown by Longo and colleagues [16], several components arein
play during the RHI experience. Hence the question arises as to
which aspect induced by the illusion is responsible for the effect on
somatosensation. If one focuses on the disownership component
alone it would be tempting to ascribe the slowing of RTs to a form of
artificiallyinduceddisownership of one’s own hand, brought aboutby
the illusion (see [17]). Once the hand no longer ‘belongs’ to the
subject, tactile inputs arising from it may take longer to get access to
conscious awareness. However, in the analysis of our questionnaire
there was no indication of feelings of disownership for the real hand
evoked by synchronous stimulation (see Figure 4). Instead, our
findings revealed that a robust sub-component of the questionnaire is
the spatial component of visual capture, i.e., the systematic alteration
of the perceived location of touch. This finding has been documented
consistently across studies, leading to the suggestion that the RHI
includes a multisensory spatial mislocalization component due to
visuo-proprioceptive conflict [34]. Once the illusion is established,
touch is captured somewhere else by vision of the rubber hand. We
therefore hypothesized that the slowing down of tactile processing
found in Experiment 1 could originate from the spatial mismatch
between visual and proprioceptive inputs related to the participant’s
hand location, rather than from hand disownership.
Experiment 2 aimed at more directly test the alternative
hypothesis. Can visual-proprioceptive mismatch bring about the
same results on speeded tactile detection? In Experiment 2 we
induceda mismatchbetween visual and proprioceptive inputsabout
the position of the participant’s real hand by using prismatic lenses
diverting the visual location of the subject’s hand 15u leftward to its
proprioceptively defined location. As anticipated in the Introduc-
tion, prismatic lenses selectively affect visual spatial location of the
hand without affecting the sense of ownership of the seen hand,
which in this case remains unquestionable. If our alternative
hypothesis were true, we predicted that RTs to tactile stimuli should
be slowed while looking to one’s own hand via the prisms.
This simple form of spatial conflict between visual and
proprioceptive inputs was indeed sufficient to affect participants’
tactile performance in a similar way to Experiment 1. RTs to
tactile stimuli were longer during the conflicting than the non-
conflicting conditions. Although direct comparison of perfor-
mances across different groups should be interpreted with
caution, we compared mean RTs across experiments. An
additional t-test was performed between the mean differences
due to the induction of the RHI (i.e., synch post - synch pre in
experiment 1) and those due to prism exposure (i.e., prism
condition - neutral condition in experiment 2). No significant
difference was found (p=0.9; means 30.38 and 28.76, respec-
tively). In other words, the size of the effect was comparable when
absolute group differences were subtracted.
It is worth noticing that we found slower RTs despite the fact
that the subject’s hand, as a result of the displacement of the
fixation point, was seen in more central vision in the prismatic
than in the neutral conditions. Our tactile task, not spatial in
nature, was unlikely to cause visual enhancement of touch
perception [35–37]. However, the visual position of the hand
closer to fixation might have, if anything, cued tactile detection.
Instead, negative effects were found on touch perception by
maintaining unchanged the distance from fixation to the
proprioceptive position of the hand (see [38,22]).
In addition, we found a significant drift of the perceived position of
the participant’s hand towards its optically displaced visual position.
Finally, the observed effects were independent of any change in
egocentric reference system, as assessed by the open-loop pointing
task. As expected, the short period of prisms wearing, during which
touch perception was assessed, did not bring about any after-effect.
Our results are twofold. First, we showed that the RHI induced
a slowing of tactile RTs. Second, we showed that the same effect
was induced by wearing prism lenses. In a nutshell, what the two
experimental set-ups have in common is the visuo-proprioceptive
conflict. On the basis of these findings, we suggest that it is the
visuo-proprioceptive conflict per se that modifies tactile perception,
and not disownership (see Figure 1).
The present study aimed at testing the hypothesis that
embodiment of a fake limb, induced via the RHI, determines
the disembodiment of the subject’s real limb, both at sensory and
at the experiential levels. In particular, we assessed whether any
disembodiment would be reflected by the participants’ answers to
a questionnaire and by altered performances at a relatively low
level of somatosensory processing. To this aim, in Experiment 1
we measured changes in speeded tactile detection tasks for supra-
threshold touches delivered to the participant’s hand in the RHI
context. Like in any RHI study, we found that synchronous cross-
modal training produced a significant shift in the felt position of
the participants’ hand that was larger than that observed after
asynchronous stimulation. More interesting, we found evidence
that tactile RTs were slower after the induction of the RHI.
Participants’ tactile performance was selectively affected after
synchronous visuo-tactile training (i.e., visual brushing of the fake
hand concurrent with tactile brushing of the unseen real hand).
The absence of changes in the asynchronous visuo-tactile training
condition ruled out possible interpretations in terms of fatigue or
unspecific test-retest effects on tactile RTs. Our results differ from
those recently reported by Longo and colleagues [39] who found
improved tactile perception in a Grating Orientation Test with
near sensory threshold intensities, due to synchronous stroking as
compared to asynchronous or no stroking (but see [40]). However,
it must be noticed that in their study the rubber hand was reflected
in a mirror and appeared as projected in a position coincident with
the participant’s real hand (i.e., no visual-proprioceptive mis-
match). This arrangement caused a visual enhancement of touch.
By contrast, in our study, participants saw the rubber hand 15 cm
left from the real hand. The mismatch of the visual from the
tactile/proprioceptive location of the hand makes the enhance-
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effect on the performance. As suggested by an anonymous
reviewer, the role possibly played by shifts in covert attention
should also be taken into consideration in the study of the RHI
and its implications for ownership.
Overall, the findings of Experiment 1 concerning touch and
proprioception confirm and extend those reported by Moseley and
colleagues [17]. Yet, they may not be readily interpreted as tactile
consequences of hand disownership. In the questionnaire, we found
a very weak agreement with statements describing the loss of one’s
own hand, compared to ownership of the rubber hand. There was
no significant difference, nor a trend for differential modulation of
theagreementwithdisownershipasafunctionofthesynchronousvs.
asynchronous condition. This result questions the disownership
interpretation of the tactile disruption (model 1 in Figure 1). In
addition, it should be emphasized that tactile disruption emerged in
our data only for RTs, and not for accuracy, whereas hand
disownership should in principle affect the overall capability to
consciously perceive touches, thus increasing the number of
omissions of tactile stimuli[14], instead of merely slowing down the
process of an otherwise preserved detection.
In Experiment 2 we assessed an alternative explanation for the
slowing of tactile RTs observed in Experiment 1. Instead of
considering the tactile effect as the ultimate consequence of the
causal chains induced by the RHI set up, we considered whether it
could instead be a direct consequence of visual capture of touch
(model 2 in Figure 1). Because of synchronous stroking of the
unseen real hand and the visually seen rubber hand, any tactile
stimulus on the real hand is visually localized in a position that is
not congruent with the one coded via proprioception, thus giving
rise to a highly unnatural conflict between the visual and the
proprioceptive maps of the hand location. To solve this conflict the
brain may diminish the weight attributed to somatosensory inputs
[41], which may result in slower reaction times. To test this
hypothesis we induced an artificial misalignment of the visual and
proprioceptive position of the participants’ hand by using
prismatic goggles. We asked the participants to report unseen
tactile stimuli delivered on their own hand while looking at it with
prismatic lenses which displaced the position of the hand leftward
of its real location. Participants were thus put in a conflicting
situation that resembled in many ways the one produced under
conditions of the RHI: (i) they felt touch on the seen hand; (ii) the
seen hand was not congruent with proprioceptive signals; (iii) the
seen hand was their own. Like in the RHI, the results showed
slower RTs to tactile stimuli during this visual/proprioceptive
conflict, compared to a condition where participants wore neutral
goggles. Again, in Experiment 2 like in Experiment 1, the subjects’
accuracy was not affected by this manipulation.
We suggest that what the two experiments have in common is
that the participant’s brain no longer ‘knows’ where the real hand
exactly is. The conflict is similarly solved via a visual capture of
proprioception, as shown by the proprioceptive drift exhibited by
participants. The shift in the proprioceptive judgment was
selectively present when the conflict was established, i.e., when
subjects were wearing the prisms as compared to the two
conditions when they wore the neutral goggles. It is interesting
to note here that there can be visuo-proprioceptive conflict only if
both sources of information concern the same object, namely one’s
own hand. This is a prerequisite to any multisensory integration.
In our case, this implies that a precondition for the tactile effect
and proprioceptive displacement to occur is the misalignment of
visual and proprioceptive maps in the presence of ownership.
Ownership of the seen hand seems to constitute the sine qua non
condition. In Experiment 1 we indeed found that only when the
hand was felt as one’s own, as shown by the proprioceptive drift
and questionnaire, the RTs slowed down. In the control condition
with asynchronous training, the visuo-proprioceptive mismatch
was the same as in synchronous training (Experiment 1) and in the
manipulation with prisms (Experiment 2). However, in that case
subjects did not feel ownership of the rubber hand, and neither the
proprioceptive drift nor the slowdown in tactile processing was
observed. As for disownership, it remains to be shown that the
RHI does induce it and that it may affect somatosensory
perception. We found that participants did not report feeling
alienated from their hand and we showed that the effects on tactile
perception can be explained without appealing to a denial of
ownership towards one’s hand. Hence it is still an open question
whether the rubber hand literally replaces the real hand, and how
to induce disownership artificially.
To sum up, tactile perception is impaired because the
participants have lost their hand. They have lost it, not because
their hand does not belong to them anymore, but because they no
longer know where their hand is.
Supporting Information
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